United Nations (UN) human rights monitoring can be very boring. Civil servants fly into Geneva, produce piles of paper, read out much of that paperwork in a monotone voice, are asked a few seemingly innocuous questions, and provide some technical answers. The officials thank the Committee for their time, and the Committee thanks the officials for all their hard work. The polite and formal tone of international diplomacy dominates. Everyone then flies home. It all seems a long way away from the visceral issues of life and death about which so much of the human rights movement is concerned. Indeed, after one, particularly dull session of the UN Committee Against Torture (CAT), an NGO lawyer told me that she felt that the meetings often felt like a “ritualised blessing,” with little to do with the “situation on the ground.”

What might it mean to take seriously the claim that human rights processes are a form of ritual? The affinity between ritual and law, and human rights law in particular, seems powerful. For one, both law and ritual appear rule bound. Indeed, following the correct procedures and principles is central to both of their self-definitions. Furthermore, both law and ritual can be seen to prioritize means over ends. It is not where you end up that is important, but how you get there. From this perspective, the focus of human rights practice is all too often on getting the rules and documents in order, rather than looking at the concrete outcomes of such processes. For such critics, existing human rights are in danger of becoming, if they have not already done so, a technocratic and morally empty discipline. Ritual seems exactly the right word.

We can argue about whether the rule-bound self-referentiality of ritual and human right is a good thing or not. From one perspective, a focus on rules and means creates predictability, uniformity, and therefore, potentially, equality and fairness. But, from another perspective, focusing on rules and means is deeply problematic, as both law and ritual become forms of stereotyped behavior, relying on conventions that have
grown stale through unthinking overuse. Indeed, in some classic social theory, ritual works precisely because it creates an unthinking adherence to norms and values. In this paper, though, I want to begin to recuperate the ritual elements of human rights from their association with superfluous and unreflective forms of action. There is another way of looking at ritual, which does not see ritual processes as inherently empty or lacking in imagination. Such an approach focuses on the skepticism that rituals produce, and argues that doubts about the “effectiveness” or appropriateness of ritual process can be their most salient and productive feature.

This paper argues that the formal ritual of the UN human rights monitoring process can create space for the moral imagination. Far from rituals narrowing the space of normative censure, the rituals of human rights monitoring can also open up possibilities for critique. The apparently “hollow promise” of human rights, as seen, heard and felt in the buildings of the UN, can produces its own moral energies. This is not to deny that the procedures at the UN can be full of empty promises and frustrated hopes. Nor is it to claim that there are not real problems of compliance within the UN human rights system. It is to say, though, that the rituals of the UN are not all empty and meaningless. Instead, human rights at the UN takes place in what Seligman et al. have called the “subjunctive mode.” The ritual of events in Geneva can create an “as if” world of commitment to human rights, which takes shape despite, or even because of the problems and absences in existing human rights practices. This may not on its own be enough to create a situation where human rights rhetoric meets reality, but if we are to take human rights seriously we at least need to act, at some point, “as if” we do. What is more, ritual can also create an appreciation of precisely where those gaps lie between the promise and its realization.

This paper is based on fieldwork at seven sessions of the CAT between 2004-2011. The fieldwork included attending the sessions of the Committee, interviewing Committee members, NGO representatives, members of the UN secretariat, and an analysis of the documents produced for and by the Committee.

The Sessions of the Committee Against Torture

Let us start by describing a typical session of the CAT. It is early May in Geneva, and spring is well established. Around thirty men and women, all in dark suits, are seated around tables in a panelled room. Above the hum of simultaneous translation, hushed conversations are taking place in different corners of the room. Earnest young international civil servants, fluent in multiple languages, make their way around the room, restocking the piles of paper. A senior functionary from the Ministry of Justice of a South American state is reading out his country’s report, setting out article by article how they are in compliance with the convention. His junior colleagues stare into the middle distance, or at the folders in front of them. The description of arrest procedures, prison ombudsmen, and changes in the law of assault stretches over an hour, and well into a second. Another official then gives a detailed statistical breakdown, by age, gender and region, of the number of police officers who have received human rights training, as well as a fine-grained description of the curriculum. The general atmosphere is of quiet conventionality and formality, as if this is all in a days work.
So what is going on here? The CAT is formally responsible for monitoring compliance with the UN Convention Against Torture. States that have signed the Convention are required to submit an initial report one year after ratifying it, and a periodic report every four years thereafter. Over the last few years state parties have been given lists of specific issues that the Committee wants to look at, and states are expected to address these explicitly. The reporting state is then scrutinized by the Committee over a number of sessions, where reporting states read out their reports and are asked follow up questions. After receiving all the reports and listening to the presentations, the Committee issues “Conclusions and Recommendations,” detailing the steps each state should take in order to strengthen compliance with the Convention.

One of the most striking aspects of the sessions is just how polite they are. The Committee chair warmly welcomes delegations from even the most authoritarian and brutal states. Members take it in turn to routinely express thanks to the delegation for coming and say they are grateful for the delegation’s efforts in preparing their reports and the responses to questions. This is all before the day has even begun. Once oral procedures start, questions are never posed in a challenging manner. Rather they are made as suggestions, or as requests for responses to allegations that other people have made. Time after time it is stressed that the Committee is not a court. The task, everyone is told, is to promote human rights through a friendly exchange. The sessions often conclude with the Committee pointing out the issues they have been particularly impressed with or thanking reporting states for “moving in the right direction” and providing full and detailed answers. State delegates are equally respectful in their answers. It is always “an honor” to be in Geneva. The questions have always been useful and insightful. The time given by the Committee is always acknowledged and appreciated. State delegations praise the “civility” of the tone, and the “constructive” nature of the conversation. On occasion the delegations will also praise their own work, saying they are proud of their achievements since they last appeared in Geneva. The whole conversation takes places in the restrained, respectful monotone of diplomatic ritual.

It is not just the use of language that can seem ritualized. The structure of the day at the CAT is filled with formal expectations. Although state parties will have submitted a written version of their report before the oral sessions, they are still expected to read it out and allow the simultaneous translation to do its work. The use of simultaneous translation adds another layer of disembodiment to proceedings. Although the tone and affect of the translators can differ, they often speak in an unvaried voice, stopping only to ask the speaker to slow down.

Questions and answers are on highly formal topics. What is usually requested is information about formal processes and procedures, rather than substantive questions about particular events. CAT is interested in trends and processes, rather than establishing individual facts. Statistics about who has been trained or prosecuted are highly popular with Committee members, as are requests for clarification on particular points of law. A Committee member might ask, for example, about the number of compulsory medical examinations, or calls to a hotline, or further details on the exact rules of arrest and detention. The blood and guts, fear and pain, suffering and cruelty upon which the Convention Against Torture focuses could not be further away.
Sometimes, though, all this formality breaks down. This is especially the case when NGOs are given the chance to present their shadow reports to the Committee. Occasionally, NGOs will bring survivors of torture to speak to the Committee. As you might expect, survivors and their families can speak very emotionally about their experiences. The response from the Committee to this is usually a slightly embarrassed silence, and a gentle reminder that “this is not the right space for survivors to talk.” All that emotion seems to be out of place. NGOs can also try to carry out informal lobbying of Committee members, holding extra briefing sessions, or simply approaching them over lunch in the UN cafeteria. If things go too far off track the UN secretariat staff, or members of the Committee themselves, can gently, and with the civility that you would expect, guide the procedures back in line. These apparent breakdowns in formality therefore tend to reinforce the sense that there are “correct” ways of doing things.

Politics and Diplomacy

There are, of course, good structural reasons for the non-confrontational tone in Geneva. The Committee has limited or no investigatory powers and is therefore not in a position to challenge anyone on points of fact. The recommendations of the Committee also have no direct means of enforcement. When the Committee makes recommendations, it can follow up and monitor responses, as it increasingly does, but it has no coercive capacity to impose compliance. If reporting states have a dislike or lack of interest in the work of the Committee they can simply refuse to turn up, as many of them do. The general rule is that nearly all reporting states are several years behind in their reporting obligations. In this sense, the Committee is little different from the rest of the UN human rights monitoring system, and is caught up in exactly the same constraints and limitations. In the absence of any hard power, the CAT must rely on the gentle power of persuasion. It must cajole and carefully point in the right direction, all in the voice of extreme politeness.

However, whether or not there are good political reasons for the civil tone, all this diplomatic politeness is still significant. It affects the ways in which work is done in Geneva, and therefore the content and nature of human rights monitoring. As well as acknowledging the structures of inequality within which human rights takes place, it is therefore also important to understand the social interactions through which these structures take effect and are played out on the ground. The formal civility of human rights monitoring has implications for the ways in which human rights work is carried out in practice, the forms of conviction it can accommodate, the emotional energies that it can direct, and the moral frames though which it is assessed, amongst other things.

Civility and Hypocrisy

At times all the civility in Geneva can come close to seeming like hypocrisy, a façade that hides what people really think and feel. I once sat through a presentation from the US delegation before the Committee, at the height of the controversy over Abu-Ghraib and Guantánamo, as a US State Department lawyer claimed that the interrogation techniques used in Guantánamo could not be defined as torture. The Committee members all nodded, thanked him for his answers and proceeded to the
next question. Afterwards, I asked one of the representatives from Human Rights Watch whether the man from the State Department could “really believe” what he was saying. I was given a slightly confused look before being told “I am not sure that is relevant. He is simply a lawyer, making an argument for his client.” From such a perspective, the procedures of the Committee are all about surface presentation. Committee members themselves can add to the sense that the politeness in the Committee rooms is just a thin veneer, hiding what people really think and feel. Despite their constant praise for reporting states, once they are away from the formal sessions, members can be highly critical. Several of the Committee members were visibly angry with the US response, for example, but did not feel able to show this emotion in the Committee room. More generally, in the cafes of the UN and Geneva, complaints from Committee members can include claims that the reporting states are not taking the process seriously, or that they are taking it far too seriously altogether. Authoritarian states are criticized for simply not providing enough information or for hiding behind formalities. Other states, perhaps new to the process, are gently ridiculed for not knowing how to do things properly. Some states from Western Europe are criticized for demanding too much time, when there is nothing really to talk about. Why bother with Luxembourg, as one Committee member put it?

If the formality of the encounters in Geneva create a dissonance between public politeness and private ridicule, what should be made of this? Is this where we can find the ritualistic moral void at the heart of the human rights regimes? Some may object to all this civility on moral grounds, arguing that the formalism of human rights procedures forces people to be inauthentic and hide what they really think and know, robbing the human rights system of any moral authority. It seems to me, though, that even if this is true, mendacity and hypocrisy are pretty low down a list of vices, especially when compared to the life and death issues that are being dealt with at the CAT. To say that the UN human rights monitoring system forces people to say things they do not really believe does not seem a particularly powerful criticism. There can be perfectly good reasons for dissimulating and not “not telling the whole truth.” Hypocrisy has its virtues. A strict emphasis on the cultivation of sincere selves in the Committee rooms of Geneva only really makes sense if we think that authentic personalities acting in “good faith” is the principal aim of human rights interventions.

In defense of diplomatic niceties, it might be argued that that the civility of the CAT is what enables it to exist in the first place. Speaking more broadly, civility has been seen as a key way of dealing with difference and disagreement. A commitment to show formal respect allows even the bitterest opponents to engage with one another. It enables us to agree to differ without violence. Civility also creates a basis for communication across cultural, as well as political, boundaries. As John Cuddihy puts it, “socialisation into the rituals of civility allows us to deal with strangers.” Civility may not be a warm, fuzzy form of social recognition, and remains relatively cold and formal. Yet it is this formality that allows it to function, as it means that our deepest convictions are not at stake. From this perspective, without the formal politeness of the CAT, the Committee simply could not do its work. The fact that the proceedings are so boring is a good thing. If they were full of visceral emotion and excitement it would be much more difficult to discuss the issues of life and death, pain and suffering that are at stake. Nor would be possible for conflicting and sometimes violently opposed groups and states to come together. States, for example, would refuse to turn up. If people could say what they really felt, nothing would get done.
There would be no space for engagement and dialogue. It would be much more difficult for conversations to take place about interrogation practices or anti-terrorism laws, for example. NGOs and civil servants would find it more difficult to exchange information. States would not be scrutinized in however limited a way. The hard work of improving human rights situations requires compromises, for us to talk about complex and sometimes troubling matters as if they were straightforward. Strategic disingenuousness, dressed up in the language for civility, can be a means to an end.

All of the above is probably true. However, civility also has its dark sides. A critical perspective might argue that the emphasis on civility is a way of regulating, even domesticating, the radical potential of human rights. It stops from being said what should be said. It means that we cannot tell it like it is and denounce the unacceptable. Instead, we have to tread carefully around the rules of etiquette. Rather than denouncing a country for widespread and systematic abuses, Committee members have to tread softly, make gentle suggestions, damn with faint praise, or request further information. Reporting states can engage with formal issues, read out the number of people who have attended training sessions, or explain the structure of the prison ombudsman’s office, rather than deal with the hard issues at the heart of abuse and ill-treatment. The diplomatic civility of human rights monitoring is therefore inherently conservative allowing the status quo to remain undisturbed, and thereby serving to perpetuate inequality and injustice. It might well be argued that shouting and screaming in Geneva, telling it like it really is, would not get anything done either. But is it still important to acknowledge that there is a price attached to all this politeness. This is one of the reasons why my praise for ritual is only partial.

**Boredom and Skepticism**

For its critics, the moral energy and radical potential of human rights regimes has been tamed through a fixation on procedure. However, the apparent civility of human rights processes does not automatically mean that they lack a moral charge. Indeed, precisely the opposite is often the case. To understand how and why this happens, let us now return to the boredom exhibited by many of the people in the Committee room, with which this paper started.

In many of the sessions of the CAT there is a sense that no one is really interested in what is going on. Committee members may be in the room, but they are not paying any attention or engaging with the procedures. Even the NGO delegates can, on occasion, seem as if they are only there for appearance’s sake. It is important to turn up, to have your say, to be seen by your respective state, but that is all. At times, all this civility can tip over into what appears to be apathy. Committee members, state representatives and NGOs constantly enter and leave the meeting room. They talk on their mobile phones. They check their emails. They flick through the piles of documents in front of them. In the complete absence of drama people yawn, shuffle and look around them. Whilst doing fieldwork, when I told people that I was sitting in on every meeting of a particular session, they would often roll their eyes, gasp, or ask me how I managed to keep sane. One NGO representative, a middle-aged lawyer representing an American prison reform organization, said that she found it almost impossible to follow the meetings for their entire duration, some of which lasted up to three hours without a break. She was more often than not day-dreaming or thinking of
all the things that she had to do when she got back to New York. Boredom is the name of the day at the CAT.

How should we understand this apparent lack of interest? Although most meetings and bureaucracies are certainly boring, boredom is not the necessary outcome of seemingly stale rules and procedures. Repetition can create its own forms of enchantment. Going to church and sitting through endless sermons might, for example, be very dull, but it can also produce a sense of wonder and the sublime. So what is the difference? There is nothing intrinsic to any event or action that makes it boring. Instead, boredom, as Lars Svendson argues, should be understood as a product of intentional action.16 It is created by expectations that are not met, and produced by an anticipation that something else is possible. As such, the claim to be bored is rooted not just in a private interior state of an individual, but in the wider social and environmental context. Describing something as boring, or indicating that you are bored, is passing a negatively charged judgment on a particular situation, saying that it is an impediment to more important goals or actions. In this sense boredom is crucially different from something like ennui, as the experience of ennui is precisely a product of the sense that there is nothing to do, and no reason to do it. In contrast, you are bored because you think there is something better to do. From this perspective then, the apparent boredom exhibited by so many people at the CAT can be understood as an evaluative stance. The Committee is seen as a frustrating impediment to other goals and activities. It is a boredom marked by frustration. It is not a lack of interest, but impatience.

Very few of the NGOs, and even the UN civil servants present in Geneva, had a good word to say about the Committee, accusing it of being inefficient, incompetent or confused. The practices of the Committee were routinely described as flawed and inadequate by almost all those who took part in its work. The jurisprudence of the Committee is notoriously under-developed. There are also basic institutional capacity problems facing the Committee. The Committee members have problems in verifying or checking whether the information given to them by states is true or not. The general consensus amongst NGOs, and many others, is that the Committee is “weak” and unable to effectively challenge states.17 Although the UN human rights system generally is often seen as being problematic, the CAT is widely singled out for particular criticism. People are bored in Geneva because they feel the Committee is an impediment to effective human rights work.

Ritual and the Moral Imagination

If boredom is more than simply apathy, it can be said to reveal the aspirations, hopes and fears of those who profess to be bored. With this in mind, let us now return to the moral structure of ritual, in order to think through the moral charge of human rights monitoring at the UN. Crucially, for our purpose at least, rather than rituals creating an unthinking acceptance, or a form of mystification, participants in rituals can also be seen as conscious and reflexive agents.18 One implication of this is that rituals do not necessarily hide what is going on, but create spaces for reflection on the most important social, political and economic processes. Rituals do not necessarily restrict debate and contestation, but can produce it. We should not assume that the participants or audience to a ritual are convinced by all its claims. Rituals can become malleable avenues for dissent as much as acquiescence. As such, rather than close
down criticism, rituals can open them up. Ritual is not inherently stale or empty, but can be full of critiques and contestations.

Even if they do not produce conformity and compliance, rituals clearly do something. Rituals have an effect, even if it is not always entirely clear what this is. One only needs to think about the ritual of elections, marriage, or university graduation, to see that this is the case. So what is it that they do? One of the things that rituals can do is produce “criteria for judgment.” Rituals become the media through which participants define their wider experience, albeit in different ways. For Roy Rappaport, for example, to undergo a ritual is to commit in some way to the criteria it produces. This does not mean you cannot question the criteria, or more probably their application, but it does mean that you accept that they set the frame for debate. In Rappaport’s account, participants in ritual demonstrate to others and to themselves their submission to the criteria that the ritual establishes. They do so, whether they “believe” in the ritual or not. In his gloss on Rappaport’s work, Michael Lambek illustrates this point by arguing that the ritual of marriage, for example, does not determine whether people are faithful or in love, but it does allow their actions to “fall under such descriptions.” Whether we “believe in marriage,” or think that it makes any practical difference, once we are married we allow others to judge our actions by that criteria. As Lambek points out, the lived experience of having been married can fall short of its description in the marriage ceremony, revealing the inadequacy of its terms and opening up space for skepticism. But this is a skepticism that uses the criteria of marriage as its starting point, even if it ends up rejecting it. Crucially, a skepticism about the ritual of marriage can either mean changing our behavior or trying to redefine what marriage means and how it is enforced. Very rarely does it result in the total irrelevance of the category of marriage for the ways in which we judge relationships.

What has any of this got to do with human rights? The most important thing for our purposes is that ritual can engender doubt. Skepticism about ritual is not a weak point in the system, but one of its greatest strengths. Ritual is not the opposite of political contestation, but crucial to the ways in which that contestation takes shape. It is because we have doubts about marriage rituals, or funerals, for example, because we question what they really mean and whether they matter, that we are forced to grapple with marriage and death as transcendent moral issues, and to take their meanings and implications seriously. Exactly the same can be said about human rights. Human rights monitoring can be understood as a ritual that establishes criteria for judgment, and at the same time skepticism about the application of those criteria. The key point is that human rights norms, however vague, are accepted as framing the engagement. States may or may not be committed to the principles, NGOs may or may not think human rights monitoring works, but once reports are sent to the UN, once people turn up in Geneva, everything they do can be assessed according to human rights principles. Human rights-based assessments may result in a skepticism about the commitments of states, or even the very principles of human rights, but the important point is that it is the monitoring process that itself creates the possibility for these criticisms and disappointments. For an effective human rights system, it is not enough to be committed to human rights, but you must also act “as if” you are committed. In practice, human rights practitioners in the corridors of the UN building are distinguished by a marked lack of persuasion about the UN human rights monitoring process. It is the inadequacy of events in Geneva that can give their moral and
political critique content. Rather than a hollow participation in human rights monitoring, these very rituals can produce a space for dissent, reform and even rebellion.

However, rituals do more than simply open a space for skepticism. In Maurice Bloch’s classic account, rituals can also dramatize the relationship between the transcendental and the immediate, helping people to understand the ways in which “ordinary life” might be part of something larger or more permanent. One of the central moral problems for human rights practitioners is how their seemingly low-key and mundane everyday activities relate to wider projects of political and social transformation in other times and other places. Committee members, NGO activists and others gathered in Geneva, for example, face uncertainties about the ways in which the form-filling technicalities of the UN human rights process relates to the wider goal of eradicating cruelty and suffering on a global scale.

Geneva is one key place where the universal, if not transcendent, claims of human rights come down to earth. Even if human rights can lack a sense of the sublime, and it is not entirely clear on what basis they claim a universal significance, one of the central attractions of human rights to many people is that they speak of a world of moral and political possibility that is greater than the mundane or brutal lived experience of the everyday. If human rights did not come down to earth, they would remain a disembodied form, a promise never fulfilled, always delayed for another place and another time. Without some form of activity such as found in Geneva, it is hard to imagine how human rights could go beyond a collection of local and specific struggles.

The repetition of bureaucracy is particularly important here as it helps create at least in a formal sense of equivalence and equity, the idea that other states have gone there before and been treated in the same way, held to account by the same principles. The fact that all states, whether the US or Togo, have to fill in the same forms and answer the same questions in the same way, formally at least, is of great significance. The simple act of turning up and formatting documents in the same way means that states must act “as if” human rights mattered. Indeed, this ritualized “as if” plays a crucial role in knitting together an otherwise fragmented world of human rights practice. It can help to bind together a disparate series of localized political struggles and small scale bureaucratic actions. In a world of human rights practices marked by contradictions, disappointments, opposition and a lack of capacity, the rituals of Geneva can help create a sense “as if” human rights really were taken seriously by all those involved. This is human rights operating in the subjunctive, a world of “could be,” potential and hope, where it is possible to imagine that human rights really can force people and states to change their behavior for the better.

In his influential genealogy of human rights thinking, Costas Douzinas has argued for a recuperation of the radical hope that he sees as once being central to the human rights project. For Douzinas, such radical potential has been tamed by the deadening hand of bureaucracy and institutionalization. Yet, as this paper has argued, hope and bureaucracy do not necessarily stand opposed. One of the ways in which Geneva is able to create a sense that there is more to human rights than the here and now is precisely by it being so obvious to so many people just how much is lacking from the formal mechanism of human rights monitoring.
Conclusion

Human rights monitoring is imbued with ritual. For Stephen Hopgood, for example, human rights have become a form of secular, post-Christian religion, with human rights institutions as its church and human rights actors as its high priests. The implicit parallels being drawn here are not with religious fervor, but with seemingly stale and empty rites. Human rights are not being compared to religiously inspired revolt, but with an obsession with text, ceremony and formality. Yet, under the right circumstances ritual can enhance human rights practices. Ritual can create forms of critique and dissent. It can also produce spaces of civil engagement on issues that might otherwise be too controversial to discuss. Ritual can help produce a sense that there is more to human rights struggles than individualized local conflicts. Finally, ritual can force states and others to act “as if” human rights mattered.

None of the above is to deny that there are very serious problems with the UN rights monitoring system in general, or the CAT in particular. The monitoring process is replete with real and serious quandaries, obstacles and inadequacies. Reporting states are able to sign up to human rights treaties and then ignore them, or interpret them well outside the spirit with which they were drafted. States can sign up to human rights treaties and then simply refuse, or forget, to fulfill their reporting obligations. States can ignore the recommendations of the Committee and the UN is powerless to do anything about it. The shaming strategies that lie at the heart of the UN can produce spaces for the deflection of responsibility, as human rights indicators can become confused with human rights. And the ritual of human rights is caught up in all these problems. This paper only offers two cheers, rather than three cheers for ritual. Ritual may allow ritualized forms of dissent to current human rights practices; it can also create spaces for cynicism, where the “as if” of human rights practices means that the noble words spoken in Geneva are not backed up by concrete action.

The crucial point, though, is that it is not simply because the UN human rights monitoring system is rife with ritual that it has real problems when it comes to enforcement. When it comes to enforcement, ritual is low down the list of problems associated with the CAT. Indeed, there is no necessary connection between the ritual nature of the events in Geneva and the wider, substantive or formal, “enforcement deficit.” It is possible to imagine a monitoring process that was marked by a lack of form and ceremony that was equally ignored. The problem of enforcement seems to me to be a fundamentally political issue, linked to the relative sovereignty of states, and cannot simply be reduced to monitoring’s apparently ritual nature. This is not to say that there might not be other ways of making the human rights struggle concrete, procedures without the form-filling, document-shuffling bureaucracy of the CAT. There is surely more to human rights than a transcendent bureaucracy. I am convinced, though, that whatever these forms take, they will involve a fair amount of ritual.

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10 Kelly, “The UN Committee Against Torture”.
15 Douzinas, *The End of Human Rights*.
17 Kelly, “The UN Committee Against Torture”.
20 Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion*.
21 Rappaport, *Ritual and Religion*.
25 Kelly, “The Cause of Human Rights”.
26 Douzinas, *The End of Human Rights*.
27 Hopgood, *The Endtimes of Human Rights*.
28 Kelly, 2011.