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Partial truth and reconciliation in the longue durée

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This paper argues that there are many possible sequences of truth, justice and reconciliation after conflict. Finding the apt path for a particular place and time requires peacebuilders to network across learning organisations that are responsive to local voices. Peacebuilding is construed as a craft of responsive governance. It requires patience and resilience because most peace initiatives fail, even though most successes are built on the foundation of prior failures. Data from the first 12 cases of the Peacebuilding Compared project are used to develop these themes that imply being oriented to what Susanne Karstedt calls the longue durée of peacebuilding.

Introduction

Since the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, under the charismatic leadership of Archbishop Desmond Tutu, built on the earlier experience of Latin American truth commissions, truth and memory have been seen as fundamental to peacebuilding. And national transitional justice institutions have been seen as the appropriate vehicles for their realisation. Through analysing very different cases of peacebuilding, this article concludes that expanding zones of bottom-up truth or reconciliation often enables top-down truth-telling or reconciliation to take hold. Moreover, it finds that reconciliation can occur on a foundation of only very partial truth or even lies. The Truth and Reconciliation model tends to assume that truth precedes reconciliation. In some of the cases we consider, it is reconciliation that opens a path to high-integrity truth-seeking. This leads to the conclusion that understanding how peace is built first requires an uncoupling of truth and reconciliation in a specific context. Second, where partial truths and reconciliations do support each other, we must analyse both truth-reconciliation and reconciliation-truth sequences. Third, we do better to eschew top-down statist analysis in favour of considering a networked
governance of reconciliation. The database for these conclusions is the first 12 cases of the Peacebuilding Compared project (http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au). This is a project which over 20 years aspires to code 670 variables for the major armed conflicts that have afflicted the world since 1990.

Post-conflict peacebuilding in Indonesia

The first volume of the Peacebuilding Compared project dealt with armed conflicts across the Indonesian archipelago in Aceh, West Kalimantan, Central Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi, Maluku, North Maluku and West Papua that raged just before and after the turn of the millennium (Braithwaite et al., 2010a). International intervention in these conflicts was very limited, though Aceh had a brief experience of peace monitors from European Union and Association of South East Asian (ASEAN) states during the past decade, and West Papua experienced a short United Nations peacekeeping operation in the 1960s.

We connect this spike in serious armed conflict in so many provinces of Indonesia to the collapse of the Suharto regime, which in turn was connected to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–98. Suharto was simply unable to manage this crisis. Indonesia, like all the cases discussed in this paper, experienced Durkheimian (Durkheim, 1897/1952) anomie as a factor in the onset of the conflict, a condition that was only slowly transcended after conflict in all those cases (except West Papua where anomie and conflict has never ceased). Anomie in this context meant firstly that the settled rules of the political game became unsettled; secondly, who had the legitimacy to wield power was also up for grabs.

One of the contenders for wielding power was the Indonesian military. With the rules of the game up for grabs many in the military made their grab using the tools that they most decisively controlled, armed force (Bertrand, 2004). Often they hedged political bets by using proxies such as militias that they armed. This gave generals deniability in circumstances of civilian control returning.

Organisational power for political mobilisation was thin across most parts of Indonesia. The collapse of Indonesian democracy between the 1950s and the 1990s meant there were not really political parties available for capture by ambitious new political leaders. In many parts of the country religious organisations were the readymade vehicle for mobilisation of large numbers of people (van Klinken, 2007). In some parts, indigenous organisations also had formidable capacity to mobilise large numbers of people. Hence, it was not surprising that much of the Indonesian conflict involved mobilising military, religious and ethnic organisations.

When peace processes were settled in these conflicts (with the exception of West Papua) reconciliation between the military and civilian society, inter-religious and inter-ethnic reconciliation were all therefore important. There was more than a little in common among these three types of reconciliation. The most impressive of them was interfaith reconciliation between Muslims and Christians. The rest of the world could learn a great deal from how the largest Muslim country in the world handled religious conflict over the past decade. After 2002, Iraq, Afghanistan and
Pakistan took over from Indonesia as the part of the world with the most serious terrorism problem. During a decade when terrorist bombings have steeply increased, particularly in these three countries, it has equally steeply declined in Indonesia. Before September 11, 2001, the Western media paid little attention to the fact that, for example, bombs went off simultaneously in several dozen Indonesian churches simultaneously during Christmas Eve services in 2000.

Interfaith dialogues at both local and national levels were important to securing a new basis for religious peace. In some locales centuries old traditions of inter-religious peace and tolerance that were sealed by indigenous rituals of peacemaking were mobilised. In others, women from the different religious groups defied fundamentalist male religious leaders to make the first brave moves to meeting and praying together for peace. Once interfaith peacemaking gained momentum in a particular place, political leaders were pragmatic enough to harness it. They allowed, indeed encouraged, Muslim leaders from the home villages of young fighters of Laskar Jihad who were razing Christian villages in places like Ambon to work with Muslim leaders in Ambon to persuade them to hand in their guns and return to their village. The government was also pragmatic enough to give amnesty to the thousands of jihadist fighters who responded to these religious appeals. They were even pragmatic enough to allow terrorists convicted of serious bombing and other atrocities early release from prison, exceptionally early by any Western standard of early release, so long as they became part of a religious campaign to persuade their former comrades that violence was not the best way to struggle for an Islamic state with Sharia law. Families were generously plied with flights from far-flung parts of Indonesia to prison in Jakarta and even flights to Mecca if they would join in the project of persuading their young men to convert to non-violent jihad. In all of the forms of reconciliation that occurred in Indonesia, gotong royong and non-truth with reconciliation were recurrent patterns.

**Gotong royong, non-truth and peacemaking**

_Gotong royong_, a core tenet of Indonesian philosophy meaning mutual aid or ‘joint bearing of burdens’ (Geertz, 1983), is a widespread modality of healing. The military, whose actions in fuelling the conflict in most of the Indonesian conflicts, and whose inactions in preventing it in all of them, caused so much resentment, participated widely in gotong royong by rebuilding houses that had been lost to victims on both sides. One reason reconciliation has been less studied in Indonesia is perhaps that little of it has been done by national elites or even provincial elites. The politics of reconciliation that mattered happened bottom-up as a micro-politics massively dispersed among thousands of leaders of villages, clans, churches, mosques and sub-districts.

Reconciliation is a word that might mean many things. One of the things it can mean in Indonesia is gotong royong. We can see the point of view of some scholars who think reconciliation is a concept with too little precision (Parmentier & Weitekamp, 2007, pp. 109–144). Some research suggests that restorative justice may be more effective in changing hearts than in changing minds (Braithwaite, 2002). After many restorative justice encounters that the Peacebuilding Compared group has experienced in its
fieldwork, empathy for the suffering of the other increases, but political views about the politics of the civil war do not change. Changing hearts, changing minds, forgiveness, apology, helping one another through gotong royong, former enemies shaking hands and agreeing to put the past behind them; these are all very different things. Yet we do, perhaps unproductively, perhaps not, lump them together in a discussion of types of reconciliation.

While the Indonesian legislature passed a law to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in 2004 (which was declared unconstitutional in 2006) and made this an important term in peace agreements with combatants, the post-Suharto pattern is of non-truth and reconciliation. At first we found the low level of political commitment to high integrity truth-seeking at all levels of politics and in most civil society networks disturbing, especially when non-truth meant not just forgetting, but lies. The most common kind of lie was widespread blaming of ‘outside provocateurs’ for atrocities that were mostly committed by locals against locals. To some degree the provocateur script came up in all of our Indonesian cases, mostly, though not always, in contexts where its truth value for actually explaining events was limited.

I have been associated with the development of a theory of restorative justice where high integrity truth-seeking is central and temporally prior to reconciliation (Braithwaite, 2002, 2005). Our Indonesian data questions the centrality of a sequence from truth to reconciliation. So how was reconciliation without truth accomplished in most of these cases (least in West Papua and West Kalimantan)? Thousands of meetings across these conflict areas in the early 2000s were called reconciliation meetings. Some included only a dozen or so leaders, quite a number had hundreds of participants, some over a thousand. The most common number was more like 30 people who were key players from two neighbouring villages or the Christians and Muslims from the same village, who had been at war with each other not long before. Other meetings were called inter-faith dialogues, others indigenous rituals bearing various customary names for reconciliation meetings among the ethnic groups of that locality.

Sorrow, even remorse, for all the suffering was commonly expressed at these meetings. Tears flowed and there were often deeply sincere hugs of forgiveness. But no one ever, in any of the reports we received of these meetings, admitted to specific atrocities that they or their group perpetrated against the other. Sometimes the ethnic group that ended with control of the village would invite back only a small number of trusted families of the ethnic other as a first step toward rebuilding trust. Much of the discussion at these reintegration meetings was with government officials and humanitarian agencies who attended to offer practical assistance with the resettling of people into their old villages. A common gesture of practical reconciliation was for a Christian community to start rebuilding a mosque they had burnt down or a Muslim community to start rebuilding a church they had razed. The cleansed group might be invited back to the village to see this for themselves as a sign of the sincerity of the desire for reconciliation and to give advice on how to do the rebuilding. Then they might do some work together on the project.
When they returned, their former enemies would often organise a moving welcome ceremony for them. They would be showered with gifts of food and other necessities from a steady stream of visits to their home by former enemies who, before the conflict, had also been friends and neighbours. The point of this summary narrative is not to say this always happened. There was also bitterness, unpleasant exchanges and people who were shunned. My objective is to give a sense of how reconciliation without truth worked when it did work, which was quite a lot. When a mosque substantially built by Christian hands was opened, the Christian community would be invited and sometimes Christian prayers would be said inside the mosque. We also found rituals of everyday life to be important to reconciliation. Christians attending the funeral of a respected Muslim leader and embracing Muslims soon after the conflict were sites of reconciliation. So were Christians being invited to the celebration of Muhommed’s birthday, Muslims to Christmas celebrations, to halal bi halal (a forgiveness ritual among neighbours that occurs at the end of the fasting month of Ramadan), and so on. In our interviews we were told of simple acts of kindness that were important for building reconciliation bottom-up—an ulama who picked up an old Christian man in his car and dropped him at the market, the loan of a Muslim lawnmower to cut the grass of the Christian church. Peace zones where peace markets could operate to reopen old trading relationships were central to the trust-building of the Baku Bae reconciliation movement in Maluku. All these were included among the great variety of locally creative and meaningful ways that people reconciled without ever speaking the truth to one another about who was responsible for crimes.

Compared with governments in other post-conflict societies, the Indonesian state was also rather consistently generous in helping even those who had been the state’s most ardent separatist enemies. They were given financial assistance to rebuild destroyed homes (of which there were hundreds of thousands across the Indonesian conflicts), schools, churches and mosques (of which thousands were razed). State-supplied building materials helped greatly for poor people who wanted to show the ethnic other that they could be trusted and could live and work together again.

Maria Ericson identifies three elements as critical to securing reconciliation (Ericson paraphrased in Daly & Sarkin, 2007, p. 47):

- The establishment of safety, including bodily integrity, basic health needs, safe living conditions, financial security, mobility, a plan for self-protection, safe and reliable relationships, and social support.
- Remembrance and mourning, telling the story of one’s trauma.
- Reconnection with ordinary life.

On reflection, none of these require learning the truth of the root causes of the conflict. So it may be that we should have started Peacebuilding Compared with a posture of greater openness to non-truth and reconciliation.

For all our Indonesian evidence of reconciliation being real, and for all the statements in our fieldwork notes that informants believed it contributed greatly to what
they expected to be the likelihood of long-term peace in their communities, our theoretical prejudice is still to believe that while non-truth and reconciliation is so much better than no reconciliation, truth and reconciliation would be an even more solid foundation for the future; truth, justice and reconciliation better still. This is not only because of the contribution truth and justice can make to reconciliation, but because truth and justice can promote ‘contentious coexistence’ (Payne, 2008, p. 4), a more resiliently democratic form of sociality.

Our findings imply that we should be open to the possibility Susanne Karstedt discovered in post-Second World War Germany (Karstedt, 2005, 2010). Post-conflict justice in Europe created a space for ‘moving on’ based on a non-truth that just those in Hitler’s inner circle who were convicted at Nuremberg were culpable. But that distorted truth laid a foundation for subsequent testimony that gave voice to victims of the Holocaust. Victim testimony from the 1960s ultimately became a basis for an acknowledgement of the full, terrible truth. Then deeper reconciliation between the German people and their former enemies and victims occurred. Karstedt’s (2005, p. 4) message is that it is the ‘longue durée’ of truth and memory through victim narrative that matters.

In some ways the need for high integrity truth-seeking seems greater in Indonesia than elsewhere, given the centrality of the ‘narrative of the broken promise’ (Birchok, 2004) to the motivation of many war-makers and the perception the Indonesian state has among its citizens of failing to make commitments that are credible. Peter King more pointedly suggests that it is ‘a moot point whether there is an Indonesian learning curve on Timor, Aceh and Papua—or only a forgetting curve’ (King, 2004, p. 69). Nevertheless, we can but listen to the local voices when they say in effect that given their traditions, reconciliation without truth is what they can manage for now.

*Gotong royong* is apparent in many of the examples of non-truth and reconciliation we have discussed. Healing happens through sharing in community work projects, in building that mosque or school together. Indonesians are good at having fun when they work together; they bond through work more than Westerners do partly because the division of labour in village society is less divided, but also because sharing communal work and community welfare burdens is overlaid with cultural meanings of *gotong royong*. Back breaking work that must be done to rebuild might be seen as a burden on reconciliation in the West, infused with resentment as people struggle to do it. In Indonesia, it is much more a resource for reconciliation. Valerie Braithwaite thinks power sharing is a way to transcend disengagement and dismissive defiance more broadly (Braithwaite, 2009). Perhaps *gotong royong* offers prospects of a different form of re-engagement through doing, through sharing in work rather than sharing in power.

For some village folk who have limited interest in sharing even local political power, there can be a kind of empowerment through work, in deciding where and how the mosque will be rebuilt. This may be confidence-building and ultimately commitment-building by other (rural Indonesian) means, especially when the military also joins in the *gotong royong*, as it did from Aceh to Poso to Papua. Again, this may be
a virtue of the vision (if not always the practice) involved in the Kecamatan Development Program and the Musrenbang, local bottom-up development planning processes supported by the World Bank and the UNDP in Indonesia (Braithwaite et al., 2010a). This virtue is that the radically bottom-up nature of the vision enables a more intimate connection of local power sharing to local work sharing. Power sharing and work sharing can be coupled to enable a dual assault on post-conflict disengagement and game playing. To make this more concrete, a village forum envisions what their village would look like in 20 years if they chose to use the planning resources they are empowered to spend to build a bridge at a particular spot. That is what they then decide to spend their local infrastructure money on. Then, together, in a spirit of gotong royong, with some outside engineering help, they build it. Deciding together and doing together may weave a stronger fabric of peace.

The intertwining of sharing power and sharing rebuilding work through gotong royong that we can take to be lessons of reconciliation in Indonesia may also be important as means of restoring dignity. All our Indonesian cases pulsate with assaults on peoples’ dignity as drivers of conflict. Talk to fighters who are Acehnese, Papuan, Dayak, Madurese, Kao, Laskar Christus or Laskar Jihad and one is struck by the way they see their armed struggle as a stand for the dignity of their people, their faith, dignity that had been trampled under the feet of their enemies. Indeed we can conceptualise many of these wars as moral panics that construed colonising, Christianising or Islamising others as folk devils. The moral panics led those folk devils to strike back at their stigmatisation (Cohen, 1972; Braithwaite et al., 2010a, ch. 5). We give dignity back to people who feel a loss of it when we agree to share power with them and when we pitch in to work with them on projects that they are empowered to shape and that they care about more than we do.

Peacebuilding organisations as learning organisations that practice a craft

The ancient Thucydidean, Macciavellian and Hobbesian trinity of fear, honour and interest as motives for war (Donnelly, 2008, p. 43) are evident in the first dozen cases of Peacebuilding Compared. Yet in Indonesia they are evident in uniquely Indonesian forms, in Bougainville in Bougainvillean forms, and so on. Roger MacGinty argues that Western peace support has become non-reflexive, uniform, off-the-shelf: ‘peace from IKEA: a flat-pack peace made from standardized components’ (MacGinty, 2008). This description does not fit the distinctively Indonesian approaches to crafting peace that we have glimpsed in the paragraphs above, nor in the Bougainvillean ones in the paragraphs below. In fact, much of the reconciliation work was indigenous, pre-Islamic, and not especially ‘Indonesian’; it was to a degree pela-gandong in Maluku, hibua lamo in Halmahera, maroso in Poso and Peusijuek in Aceh, among other local reconciliation traditions that are even more variegated among Dayaks, Papuans and in the next section among Bougainvilleans.

An ambition of the Peacebuilding Compared project is to learn from diversity. Yet we fear MacGinty is right that an indigenous diversity in peacebuilding of disparate strengths and weaknesses is being co-opted by templated Western orthodoxy (‘the
liberal peace’). MacGinty warns, however, against romanticising indigenous or traditional peacemaking of the kinds we describe. The awful ongoing suffering in Papua today makes it difficult to romanticise Indonesian peacebuilding. Yet during questions after presentations we have given on this work at certain centres of intellectual excellence in the West, there was evident a distaste for illiberal aspects of Indonesian peacebuilding that can close minds to seeing its strengths. Truth, justice, electoral politics and the rule of law can be romanticised as well.

The Regional Assistance Mission for Solomon Islands (RAMSI) has been one of the most intensive and extended of peacekeeping operations. It concentrated on building core pillars of the state (Braithwaite et al., 2010c). That Solomon Islands state used, and was captured by, a variety of shadow governments such as those of logging and business interests. Pillars driven into the sand of shadow states surrounding the formal state proved shaky democratic foundations. At first RAMSI’s state-building was not very responsive to either local voices or to root causes of the conflict. Braithwaite et al. (2010c) conceive of peacebuilding as the craft of learning to be more responsive. It finds that RAMSI slowly became more of a learning organisation. Responsive peacebuilding involves overcoming fear of ‘mission creep’. It means seeing ‘peacebuilding creep’ as about mission contraction as much as mandate expansion. The craft of peace as learned in the Solomon Islands was about enabling spaces for dialogue that defined where the mission should pull back to allow local actors to expand the horizons of their peacebuilding ambition.

Based on a consideration of South African data on truth and reconciliation, particularly the work of Gibson (2004), Braithwaite (2005) published the model of high-integrity truth-seeking and reconciliation in Figure 1 in the year that Peacebuilding Compared data collection got under way. Sad to say, not one of the first 12 cases of Peacebuilding Compared fits this model. Zero out of 12 is a discouraging hit rate for a social theorist interested in elaborating starting models iteratively from new

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**Figure 1. An elaborated theory of truth and prevention**
data. Nevertheless, in the next section, we consider the case that approaches closest to fitting the model of Figure 1, Bougainville.

‘Restorative Peace’ in Bougainville

Bougainville is perhaps an even better fit to the top part of Figure 1 than South Africa. It is certainly more about truth and reconciliation than the non-truth and reconciliation described for Indonesia (Howley, 2002). Where Figure 1 does not fit Bougainville’s civil war for independence from Papua New Guinea between 1988 and 1998 is that Bougainvilleans on both sides of the conflict enjoyed total immunity from prosecution. So there is for Bougainville no bottom loop to Figure 1.

Reconciliation meetings in Bougainville had similarities in format to many of the Indonesian reconciliations, even some ritual commonalities such as burying an object to symbolise the permanence of the peace and to signify that terrible things could befall anyone who broke the agreement. Across the region, many different ethnic groups, in Timor-Leste as well as Indonesia, Bougainville and Solomon Islands, believed that an unpleasant death or other terrible misfortune would be the consequence for the person who led the breaking of a peace agreement. This gave indigenous peacemaking much more holding power than internationally mediated agreements.

The main difference between reconciliation meetings in Bougainville versus Indonesia was that in Bougainville they very often led to individual admissions of serious crimes including murder and rape, whereas this never happened in Indonesia to our knowledge. The reconciliation sequence in Bougainville tended to be first an indication of a willingness to accept collective responsibility for harming another group. For example, a company of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) might be willing to admit that they burnt a particular village to the ground killing inhabitants. Many rounds of negotiation would then occur over the terms of what was to be apologised for and what compensation would be paid. Agreement to return bones of victims and bring gifts of pigs was common.

While initial negotiation of a collective responsibility ritual for a BRA company might take many months or years, it would not normally result in individual admissions of rape or murder. If the collective reconciliation went well, however, without pay-back violence, with forgiveness rather than hatred, then individuals often found the courage to ask for forgiveness from a particular family for the murder of their son/husband, the rape of their daughter. It is hard to imagine that this widespread phenomenon could have happened without the general policy of amnesty and without the confidence that traditional reconciliation could deliver. Note another divergence of the Bougainville experience from Figure 1 here. While collective truth-telling generally preceded reconciliation, individual truth-telling more often followed from collective reconciliation. So the truth-reconciliation sequence is much more complex than in Figure 1.

Braithwaite et al. (2010b) conclude that wave after wave of reconciliation has persisted for more than a decade, and continues into the future. These reconciliations
have mostly concerned the predominant form of violence which was Bougainvilleans in the BRA versus other Bougainvilleans who were protecting communities from criminalised BRA elements, or who were working with Papua New Guinea in support of national unity. Reconciliation between Bougainvilleans and the government of Papua New Guinea still has a long way to go, however, as it does between the BRA and the Papua New Guinea Defence Force (PNGDF). There were many complex dimensions to this conflict that still require reconciliation. The war actually started as a more local dispute over the huge Australian-owned Panguna copper mine, pollution from which devastated local lands. Local landowners were dissatisfied that most of the royalties for the mine went to the national government rather than local landowners. Reconciliation between the mining company, a subsidiary of Rio Tinto, and Bougainvilleans is yet be achieved. An obstacle here is that the company fears ritual apology would expose it to liability in the courts. Yet this reconciliation to some extent holds a key to international reconciliation among Bougainville, Australia and Papua New Guinea.

Another important feature of the Bougainville conflict is that then Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan sought to break through the deadlock in 1996 by hiring the mercenary organisation Sandline, on the back of recent successes they seemed to secure in Africa. Sandline was an important historical event not only because the reaction against it brought the Bougainville peace together. Until the mid 1990s, there had been an anti-mercenary norm in international affairs that had been particularly strong since the American Revolution—in fact, so strong that even in circumstances in which generals were desperate, they mostly refrained from hiring mercenaries when it would have been rational for them to do so (Percy, 2007). The end of the Cold War and the neo-liberal spirit of the 1990s created a new environment of opportunity for mercenaries. Sandline and Executive Outcomes were the most important companies in the military business. They led what were seen as successful private military operations funded by seizing natural-resource assets in Angola and Sierra Leone in the mid 1990s (Percy, 2007, pp. 209–211).

Bougainville turned this tide decisively, as it was such an unmitigated failure for Sandline, the PNG Government and their corporate mining associates in the background with an interest in taking over the Bougainville mine. Bougainville helped to sharply reinstate the international anti-mercenary norm as the handiwork of Executive Outcomes and Sandline in Africa began to be reinterpreted negatively through the prism of the ‘blood diamonds’ corporate social responsibility debate. As their (allegedly shared; Percy, 2007, pp. 213–114) corporate backers from the mining sector distanced themselves, Executive Outcomes closed its doors in 1999, Sandline in 2004. But the principals of these companies such as Tim Spicer were back with a new business model in Iraq and Afghanistan. The private military corporation was dead, especially after the imprisonment of mercenary Simon Mann and the attempted extradition of Mark Thatcher in Africa. But the private security corporation that supported the militaries of major powers (instead of dominating the militaries and states of minor nations) boomed. While Bougainville was decisively important in resuscitating an international anti-mercenary norm that was eroding until 1997, the other
reason why the anti-mercenary norm was reinstated was that a more profitable opportunity arrived with the war on terror for the entrepreneurs who had been dismantling the anti-mercenary norm. Healing over the Sandline fiasco took some serious steps forward in 2009 when Sir Julius Chan and other Papua New Guinea leaders attended a reconciliation with Bougainville President James Tanis.

Every village-level story of reconciliation was unique in Bougainville. The village in Selau where John Braithwaite lived as a student in 1969 had been the base of C Company of the BRA. Starting in 1990, when the war became chaotic, voices in the village began to be raised in favour of adopting a position of neutrality. Women from across Selau organised a peace march followed by an all-night vigil for peace that it is claimed 5000 attended—most of the population of Selau (van Tongeren et al., 2005, p. 124). The war had opened up some old internal divisions. There were allegations that the local BRA commander had used his position to murder a man who was much disapproved of because of sorcery. He was also fearfully reviled by many because he had married his own daughter. In turn, there were allegations that the combat death of that local BRA commander was ‘friendly fire’, which was in fact ‘unfriendly fire’ from loyal kin of the murdered sorcerer within C Company. Others dispute this. Reconciliation within the area and between the PNGDF and the village was accomplished in August 1991 after the women seized the peacemaking agenda with the council of chiefs and the village declared itself neutral (Saovana-Spriggs, 2007, p. 195).

Both the villagers and the PNGDF officer who attended the reconciliation ceremony remember it as moving and a turning point towards local peace. It was a peace that created an island of civility (Kaldor, 1999)—a peace zone from which peace could spread—which demonstrated the advantages of peaceful neutrality to those living in adjacent conflict areas. The PNGDF loaded all the BRA weapons from that part of Selau onto a helicopter and Sister Lorraine Garasu and elder Bernadette Ropa dropped them into the deep water just offshore from the village as part of the ceremony. This sealed the peace and the weapons disposal in this little corner of Bougainville many years before it arrived elsewhere. The story of such a single village reveals why we must always be circumspect with the grand narrative of the Bougainville peace that says it was negotiated at Burnham and Lincoln. It was in fact a cumulative peace that took quantum leaps thanks to New Zealand leadership at the Burnham and Lincoln peace talks. Some PNG security forces personnel who attended reconciliations such as that in Selau reported them as the most positive memories of their time in Bougainville, saying that the aspect of the ceremonies that most moved them was when both the soldiers and the villagers had the opportunity to speak about their personal feelings of loss for particular individuals who had fallen. One of these officers said Bougainvillan women peacemakers changed him as a soldier:

I was a very aggressive traditional soldier. Very tough on people. As a result of my experience on Bougainville, I changed. I listen to my soldiers more now. I think negotiation is more important. [He explained how he was particularly affected by the compassion of
women with children who had lost their husbands …] I wonder if my own wife would react that way if it was me who was killed. (PNGDF interview, Port Moresby, 2007)

The Selau region has a population of only 7000, but the chiefs told me in April 2006 that they had participated in 87 separate formal reconciliations by then. While hundreds of large reconciliations have been held across Bougainville for big groups, and thousands of smaller ones in relation to hamlets, families or individuals, a widespread perspective a decade after the war is that most of the reconciliations that are needed still remain to be done.

The peace in Bougainville is two stories. There is the story of top-down peace ultimately negotiated under New Zealand auspices in 1997 and 1998, and ultimately under UN facilitation of the political settlement between PNG and Bougainvillean factions in 1999, 2000 and 2001. And there is the story of zones of local reconciliation (Boege, 2006, p. 11) starting soon after the onset of war and continuing the struggle to expand its reach two decades later. Most accounts assume the top-down story is the master narrative and the bottom-up reconciliations are subsidiary. But in important ways the bottom-up micro-narratives subsume and infuse the top-down peace.

Networked governance of peace

John Paul Lederach influentially argued that peace must be not only top-down and bottom-up, but also middle-out (Lederach, 1997). Bottom-up connects the grassroots to the political projects of elites; top-down connects capacities that can be mobilised only by national elites down to lower levels of the society. Middle-out complements these vertical capacities with horizontal capacities to move back and forth across social divides. Organisations in civil society that are intermediate between the state and families/hamlets often do this middle-out work. Yet in his more recent book, Lederach found a web metaphor more useful. What he called the middle-out capacity is in fact strategic networking that ‘creates a web of relationships and activities that cover the setting’ (Lederach, 2005, p. 80). The women of Bougainville certainly did this with peace marches that wound across the island, connecting new women to the network at each hamlet they passed (Ninnes, 2006). So did the next generation of youth with the journeys of the Youth Cross. Lederach (2005, p. 91) perceptively sees the key to weaving these webs as ‘getting a small set of the right people involved at the right places. What’s missing is not the critical mass. The missing ingredient is the critical yeast.’

In Bougainville, women such as Sister Lorraine Garasu were that yeast and many local male peacemakers were as well. Gradually enough yeast is connected to the project of building the bread of peace and the mass of the bread rises. Lederach (2005, p. 90) connects this to Malcolm Gladwell’s idea from marketing of The Tipping Point (2002). Gladwell’s subtitle is ‘How little things make a difference’. The Bougainville peace is a classic illustration of how little peacemakers finally linked together to tip momentum for peace to a critical mass. This happened even as top-down peacemakers such as Theodore Miriung and John Bika were assassinated and even as the leaders of the war remained spoilers of sorts, and even as
profit-seeking international spoilers (Sandline and the shadowy multinational mining interests backing them) butted in. Once the tipping point of bottom-up support for peace was passed, progressive elements in the BRA and in the PNG military and political elite moved around the spoilers to join hands with the Sister Lorraines and the great mass of Bougainvillean peacemakers they had leavened. Gradually more elements of the hold-out militant groups right up to the time of writing in 2010 have joined in reconciliations and joined the peace.

The sequential sustaining of the peace has been patient—what Volker Boege has called a slow-food approach to peacebuilding (Boege, 2006). One wave of bottom-up reconciliation built on previous waves, expanding the geographical reach of the peace and the breadth and depth of forgiveness across the society. The architecture of the top-down peace settlement has also been sequenced, with linkages that require one side to meet a commitment before the other side will deliver their next undertaking in an agreed sequence (Regan, 2010; Wolfers, 2006). In this architecture, international peacekeepers played an exemplary role in securing the credible commitments. While peacekeepers were rarely hands-on mediators of the indigenous reconciliation, one of their greatest contributions was to initiate conversations between local enemies who were afraid of each other, allowing initial meetings to occur under the peacekeepers’ security umbrella.

Braithwaite et al. (2010b) conclude that the very top-down architecture of the peace agreement that has been such a strength is also potentially its greatest weakness. This is because it is far from clear whether there is credible commitment of the PNG Parliament and of regional powers to the final crunch of the peace deal. If Bougainville votes in a referendum for independence in the course of this second decade of the 21st century—as provided for in the peace deal—and Papua New Guinea refuses to honour the wishes expressed in that vote, young men will be motivated to return to arms to vindicate the blood of their fathers. The sequence of credible commitments so honourably completed in the peace process to date could tragically heighten a sense of betrayal if the will of the people in the agreed referendum is dishonoured. Political leadership is needed in Port Moresby and regional preventive diplomacy is required to grasp the nettle of that final commitment. This can be delivered alongside an honourable and open political campaign to persuade the people of Bougainville that they could be better off if they vote for autonomous provincial government integrated within the state of Papua New Guinea.

The Bougainville case shows that bottom-up reconciliation achieves only fragile progress when war rages around it. Yet we also found that early reconciliations paved the way to a political settlement. So we hypothesise that the commonly expressed wisdom during our fieldwork in the corridors of the United Nations in New York that ‘peacekeeping cannot work if there is no peace to keep’ goes too far. While a political settlement can create peace without genuine truth and reconciliation, and while truth and reconciliation might be unlikely to secure peace without a political settlement, truth, justice and reconciliation could be more than just value added on top of a settlement. Rather, we hypothesise that top-down political settlement and bottom-up restorative justice form a virtuous circle that consolidates deeply
sustainable peace. Peacekeeping Commander Brigadier Bruce Osborn’s metaphor was of the peace as building a house that acquired strong foundations because of traditional reconciliation and sturdy walls because of the architecture of the peace: ‘The foundations of the house were the Bougainville people. The walls were the various parties to the peace process. You had to shape, strengthen and unify those walls in order to support the roof, which was the reconciliation government, the one voice of Bougainville’ (Osborn, 2001, p. 55).

While Bougainvilleans identified with and built Brigadier Osborn’s house, they now have the space to contemplate whether it could be better buttressed by some national and international architecture. Simply because local reconciliation continues to progress reasonably well, gradually expanding its scope within Bougainville, it does not necessarily follow that a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the Bougainville war would be redundant for Papua New Guinea. No national reconciliation ceremony was ever conducted for the Bougainville war in Port Moresby.

Braithwaite et al. (2010b) characterise Bougainville through the following two comparative tables as a ‘Restorative peace’ (Table 1) based on bottom-up reconciliation and a top-down architecture of cleverly sequenced commitments to take the next steps toward deepening the furrows of the peace.

Over the next 20 years of the Peacebuilding Compared project, we will follow the ways such different dispensations succeed and fail in the resilience of peace. For the moment, Tables 1 and 2 do no more than float only provisional interpretations (as opposed to variables we code) in the hope they might provoke conversations to clarify and elaborate them. We hope the project will have a wiki quality with a conceptual architecture that will be adjusted as new cases are added. So we think it is premature in the history of the project for exegesis on what is theoretically at stake down the right-hand columns of Tables 1 and 2. That is better grounded in the experience of more cases followed up for longer. For the moment, these tables help us to see how distinctive the Bougainville peace was and the way it was distinctive. And really, that is the only claim we advance for Tables 1 and 2 at this early stage of our comparative project. Doubtless we could end up concluding that the tables are too reductively simple for any wider purpose.

Partial peacebuilding: Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and the longue durée

The other two cases where Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork has been completed, Solomon Islands (Braithwaite et al., 2010c) and Timor-Leste (writing up the Timor case is not complete), can be seen as both having qualified ‘yes’ entries in all the columns of Tables 1 and 2, though in some cases heavily qualified. They both have clear top-down political settlements, in Solomons signed after many earlier top-down peace agreements collapsed (as in Bougainville and Aceh). The Solomon Islands has been one of the most prosecutorial transitional justice processes, if not the most, the world has seen (Braithwaite et al., 2010c). All the major militant leaders, two former prime ministers, a number of other former cabinet ministers
and a significant proportion of the security forces went to prison and thousands of others were arrested. ‘Reconciliation of wrongdoing based on restorative justice/ traditional reconciliation’ (Table 1, column 3), on the other hand, has been disappointing and substantially corrupted by standover demands for compensation by militants and political leaders (Fraenkel, 2004; Moore, 2004) until the past year. Archbishop Tutu visited Solomon Islands in 2009 to turn a new page with a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and a new Prime Minister elected in 2010 has a platform of a Forgiveness Bill to release the combatants that remain in prison and concentrate on reconciliation as the nation moves forward. In Timor-Leste,
the reservations over the last two columns of ‘Yes’ entries in Table 1 are rather the reverse of those for Solomon Islands. While Timor-Leste did have a serious crimes process, it only led to punishment for a handful of Timorese as all the indicted Indonesians were shielded in Indonesia and Indonesian criminal courts launched no prosecutions that stuck. On the other hand, many of the traditional reconciliation processes over crimes of the conflict were widely regarded as successful in Timor-Leste.

Table 2. Variation in how bottom-up and top-down are truth and reconciliation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How peace is accomplished</th>
<th>Bottom-up truth</th>
<th>Top-down truth</th>
<th>Bottom-up reconciliation</th>
<th>Top-down reconciliation</th>
<th>Provisional interpretation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bottom-up truth and reconciliation: <strong>Bougainville</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Truthful local reconciliations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down truth and non-reconciliation: <strong>Chile</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Pure Truth Commission model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top-down truth and reconciliation: <strong>South Africa</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>National Truth and Reconciliation Commission model</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth and reconciliation bottom-up—top-down: <strong>Timor-Leste</strong> (a short-term attempt at it)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>National and local Truth and Reconciliation Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-truth and non-reconciliation: <strong>First World War</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Feigned forgetting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-truth and reconciliation: <strong>Poso</strong> (Braithwaite et al., 2010a)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Forgive and forget</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth and non-reconciliation: <strong>Korean War</strong></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Remember and resent Feigned forgetting, elites forgive (but hatred hides in peoples’ hearts)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-truth and top-down reconciliation: <strong>Tito’s Communist Yugoslavia</strong></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *This table lists only half the combinations of the four columns possible for these variables. It is expected that some of the hidden combinations will be brought to life as Peacebuilding Compared accumulates new cases.*
*There was some bottom-up truth in Chile from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), though nothing like the breadth of local bottom-up truth in Bougainville.*
*There were some important attempts at bottom-up truth and reconciliation in South Africa as well that were not widely based.*
Conclusion: partial truth and reconciliation in the longue durée

In both Timor-Leste and Solomon Islands, the journey to bottom-up and top-down truth and reconciliation has been flawed, sometimes corrupted, and is far, far from complete. But in both cases there is a journey that continues. Both truth and reconciliation are always partial; the recursive relationships of one to the other turn out to be much more complex than can be captured by a diagram such as Figure 1. In wars, all sides lie at times. Sometimes they lie a lot and systematically propagandise the lies. While conflict zones are afflicted by many utterly false rumours, at the same time there are also of course many versions of the truth that have merit. We have also seen that there are many bottom-up, top-down and middle-out versions of reconciliation, some with meanings like gotong royong that may not travel from one culture to another. There is always the possibility that creative peacemakers can find a path to truth and reconciliation from a past of non-truth and very partial pockets of certain forms of reconciliation.

As Karstedt (2005, 2010) argues, there is a need to remain open to diverse ways the longue durée of reconciliation might unfold. The need for this openness does seem apparent in all the Peacebuilding Compared cases to date. Negative entries in Tables 1 and 2 can become positive as a result of renewed initiatives decades after an initial peace. Obversely, positive entries can become negative ones. Even when that happens, peacebuilders can be resilient, renewing new rounds of bottom-up, middle-out and top-down peacemaking. If there is one thing we might learn from comparative histories of peacebuilding such as these it is that only the resilient, who have the attitude that most of their peace initiatives will fail, are likely to be rewarded with peaceful institutions.

Notes on contributor

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