

Chapter 11

Dark networks, bright networks and the place of the police

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In the midst of the social and economic devastation left by Hurricane Katrina, American authorities have been exploring innovative approaches to the delivery of policing and security.¹ Take as an example St Bernard Parish, Louisiana, which will soon (at the time of writing) be home to Katrina evacuees through its newly established trailer camp. The Sheriff's Department - which is itself in rather dire financial straits - predicts that this camp will create the conditions for rising crime and disorder, including activities such as fighting and the harbouring of criminals. Major Pete Tufaro, of the Sheriff's Department, has developed a proposal for the parish, involving subcontracting DynCorp International LLC, a company from Texas that has a large security contract in Iraq and provided personal security services to Afghan President Hamid Karzai. This proposal, which is subject to approval by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), would involve an expenditure of US\$70 million over three years, which would cover the costs of up to 100 deputised DynCorp staff, who would have the authority to make arrests, carry weapons and wear the uniforms of the Sheriff's Department. Major Tufaro goes so far as to say, 'You wouldn't be able to tell the difference between us and them' (Merle 2006).

One of the interesting things about this proposal is that the 'hired guns' would earn more than experienced officers in the Sheriff's Department. It would seem that competition in the security market is not sufficiently rigorous to drive prices down. Indeed, the St Bernard Parish Sheriff's Department recommended DynCorp in its proposal without arranging for competitive bidding, as it was assumed that this firm would provide the cheapest service (at less than \$700 per day per employee) compared to, for example, Blackwater USA's price of \$950 per day.

This development of a new networked arrangement for the provision of policing and security - involving a mix of public and private providers - is significant in many other respects as well. To begin with, it represents the classic economic challenge of constituting markets in ways that avoid monopolies, promote fair competition, and provide customers with various high-quality services to choose from. Linked with these economic problems are the array of governance issues that Lewis and Wood mention (Chapter 10) and which are elaborated more fully by scholars such as Singer (2003), Avant (2005) and Johnston (2006). For example, Singer notes that in the context of this particular proposal, it is unclear how well DynCorp officers will be supervised (Merle 2006).

Another most interesting aspect of this proposal is that it may serve as a marker of what could be regarded as a broader existential crisis in public policing. As Singer suggests, the kind of role that

DynCorp would take on in this arrangement certainly raises the general question of whether there is anything 'core' any more about the public police function (Merle 2006). For the public police it would seem that it is essential, now more than ever, to reflect on their own identity and the ways in which they see themselves being placed within networks of policing and security provision (Fleming, Marks & Wood 2006).

The chapter in this volume by Lewis and Wood (Chapter 10) attempts to think slightly differently about ways in which nodes and networks of policing and security can be governed, recognising the considerable 'hybridity' that already exists in the mentalities, organisational arrangements and strategies of security providers. This chapter explores a different but related issue. It is concerned with the rather existential question about the future identity of the public police as an institution. If the police, as a social institution, are uniquely knowledgeable and skilled and remain a symbol of law and order (Loader 1997) what is their place in policing and security networks? If there is something 'core' about who the police are and what they do, how do they retain this uniqueness in the face of an increasingly ubiquitous set of providers boasting a growing set of security-enhancing skills, capacities and resources? Put another way, will participation in networks ultimately threaten the identity, and possibly the very existence, of the public police and state security provision more generally?

As the chapters in this volume make very clear, police organisations the world over are being encouraged to establish partnerships and networks. This ambitious strategic direction is seen as inevitable given a range of factors, including the cost of policing and public demand for services, and the fact that contemporary forms of insecurity, such as organised crime, illicit drugs and terrorism, are themselves nodal and networked in their operations and organisational features. Even if one disregarded the imperatives of neo-liberal restructuring, empirical evidence tells us that 'bright' networks are required to manage 'dark' ones (Raab & Milward 2003). This is the position taken in the 9/11 Commission Report (National Commission on the Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004), and it is similarly taken by other reformers embroiled in efforts to improve the governance of terrorism, organised crime, illicit drugs and other forms of activity that thrive with the pulse of globalisation.

This chapter reviews ways in which public police organisations are developing networks of policing and security provision. It then explores ideas about what police *ought* to do, or at least what they ought to make sure they keep doing, as they build networks that are dedicated not only to short-term strategic improvements but to the betterment and democratic advancement of the field of policing and security generally. As part of this discussion I will put forward the notion that the self-identity of the public police organisation, as of a uniquely skilled and knowledgeable as well as legitimate and

symbolically significant organisation, can no longer be taken for granted in our nodal and networked era. This is an implicit strand that runs through this collection, and one which I would like to bring to the fore. As such, this chapter serves as something of a conclusion to this volume, focusing on what its contributors have to say, as well as on what others have to say about how police must position themselves in networks for the future in order to retain, or perhaps newly establish, a distinctive place for themselves vis-à-vis other policing and security providers.

The following section will briefly review the need for policing and security networks at local, national and international levels. It will then outline key ways in which police organisations are forming networks to address forms of insecurity expressed through 'wicked problems' (Rittel & Webber 1973) and 'dark networks' (Raab & Milward 2003).

Wicked problems and dark networks

The now extensive literature on crime prevention and community policing has long recognised that security is a 'wicked problem', as Rittel and Webber would put it:

The information needed to *understand* the problem depends upon one's idea for *solving it*. That is to say in order to *describe* a wicked problem in sufficient detail, one has to develop an exhaustive inventory of all conceivable *solutions* ahead of time. The reason is that every question asking for additional information depends upon the understanding of the problem - and its resolution - at that time. Problem understanding and problem resolution are concomitant to each other (Rittel & Webber 1973: 161, italics in original).

Consistent with this understanding of wicked problems, Goldstein, in his ground-breaking work on 'problem-oriented policing' (Goldstein 1979), advanced a vision of police as 'problem solvers' rather than 'law enforcers'. 'The police job,' he argues, 'requires that they deal with a wide range of behavioural and social problems that arise in a community - that the end product of policing consists of dealing with these *problems*' (Goldstein 1979: 242, italics in original). To deal with these problems effectively requires an understanding of their multiple dimensions and a recognition that the traditional means available to the police, bound in their legal authority and law enforcement mandate, are simply some among many means they should consider. This shift from a law enforcement orientation to a problem-solving one would enable them to break out of the 'means over ends syndrome' that, in Goldstein's view, characterises police institutions (Goldstein 1979).

As Fleming summarises (Chapter 4), police-led partnerships and networks are central to reform agendas in the English-speaking world, and in the case of the United Kingdom, are required through legislation. Despite the kinds of implementation challenges she identified, the need for local networks of policing and security is now accepted as a new kind of common sense which is embedded in the

strategic plans of police organisations. Such plans articulate a vision of police as mobilising the knowledge, capacity and resources of a wide array of police and non-police actors. As stated in *The Way Ahead*, the strategic plan for Victoria Police (2003-08), 'Often, the solutions lie within the capacity and capability of other agencies, community groups and individuals to participate in and contribute to crime prevention and community safety strategies. Sometimes, by influencing others' behaviour, the need for police intervention can be avoided altogether' (Victoria Police 2003: 16).

The question of how precisely police organisations form partnerships and networks is not an easy one to answer and put into practice, despite the simplicity of the vision articulated in documents such as *The Way Ahead*. This practical problem is of course amply demonstrated in the research conducted by Fleming (see also Fleming & Rhodes 2005) as well as in other studies that have confirmed the organisational, cultural, economic and other obstacles to realising the problem-solving vision of Goldstein and others. A recent critical commentary on 'implementation failures' is found in Bullock and Tilley's edited collection titled *Crime Reduction and Problem-oriented Policing* (Bullock & Tilley 2003) (for a review, see Bradley 2005).

Whilst recognising the need to harness other forms of knowledge and capacity in their strategies and tactics for addressing wicked problems, police are also required to harness non-police resources in furtherance of their traditional mission of law enforcement. This is the focus of Ayling, Grabosky and Shearing's chapter (Chapter 3) in this collection. The police simply do not have the resources to effectively monitor and enforce a wide variety of laws, so they require other individuals and organisations to help them do so. Within a paradigm of what Mazzerolle and Ransley describe as 'third party policing' (Mazzerolle & Ransley 2006), police enlist others through a range of mechanisms that Ayling and her colleagues describe in terms of three key forms of exchange: coercion, sale and gift.

The chapter sheds much light on the variety of ways in which police constitute what we may describe in simple terms as 'bright networks' (Raab & Milward 2003). Mechanisms for enlisting others range from being highly coercive in nature - through, for example, the use of criminal sanctions for non-compliance - to being largely voluntary, as in many instances of community policing. These authors explain their category of 'sale' in terms of the constitution of 'market networks', which consist of a range of activities including the selling of public policing services as well as the outsourcing of services previously provided by the police to private providers through contracts. The example with which this chapter began is an example of the latter, and demonstrates the degree to which contracted services delivered by private providers can resemble those delivered by public providers, as least as far as appearances go. With this in mind, as Crawford reminds us, and as Lewis and Wood discuss (Chapter 10), it is not simply state institutions like the

police that constitute market networks. A plethora of private organisations, community groups and citizens are contributing significantly to the 'commodification' of policing and security (Loader 1999). As Crawford states, 'The near monopoly that the public police enjoyed for over a century is at an end and policing, like security, has become a commodity to be bought and sold' (Crawford 2003: 496).

There are thus a variety of ways in which public policing organisations have gone about, and continue to go about, developing networks - made up of multiple forms of knowledge, capacity and resources - to support their traditional role of law enforcement as well as their more contemporary role of crime prevention. The chapters by Fleming and by Ayling, Grabosky and Shearing illustrate such attempts at the more local and national levels of policing and discuss the implementation challenges (Fleming) as well as the various normative implications (Ayling et al.) of such attempts. Other chapters in this volume, particularly those by Keelty, and Wardlaw and Boughton, speak to the current preoccupation that police organisations have with forming networks at national and international levels. These chapters demonstrate the considerable effort on the part of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in advancing this agenda, and reveal that one of the biggest challenges associated with global network formation is the need for police organisations like the AFP to remain constantly flexible and adaptable to the activities of what Raab and Milward describe as 'dark networks' (Raab & Milward 2003).

Raab and Milward state that the general literature on networks tends to take a positive view with respect to the necessity - as well as the potential - of collaborative approaches to public sector governance. Networks are seen as superior to hierarchies in tackling the wicked problems that fall outside of the mandate of any one public sector organisation. They point out, however, that wicked problems are understood by advocates of networked governance as 'socially nonreactive'. What if the problem that governments seek to tackle, they suggest, is 'not an unorganized set of poor or cognitively impaired clients but another network, perhaps engaged in illegal activity' (Raab & Milward 2003: 414)? In essence, they argue, there is much we need to learn about dark networks if we are to develop an adequate understanding of bright networks and their effectiveness.

Policy-makers and practitioners increasingly recognise that dark networks, as seen in areas such as organised crime and terrorism, are sophisticated and agile, to a point where they have easily outmanoeuvred existing systems of criminal monitoring and enforcement. In Dupont's words (Chapter 2), 'the myth of the fight against crime and the war-like metaphors on which it relied were seriously undermined by the discovery that organized crime was much less organized than initially thought and that crime syndicates were

loosely coupled alliances of individuals who retained a large degree of autonomy'.

When broken down into their component parts, networks can be seen in terms of 'nodes' that come together in a variety of ways (bonds of kinship, exchange of resources, for example) (Williams 2001: 66) for a variety of purposes, such as the generation of profits or the production of terror based on religious principles. Indeed, the dynamism of contemporary transnational crime makes it difficult to develop any single, elegant theory of dark networks. Beare stresses the importance of avoiding any uniform notions of how transnational crime operates except to perhaps suggest that the desire for profit is what unites organised crime networks. It is even problematic to assume that illicit markets operate independently of legal markets. It is more likely that there is an intersection between the two at different points in time and space. In alerting us to this, Beare is implying that practitioners and scholars must remember to conceptualise policing as part of a broader process of social and economic regulation that shapes the behaviour of otherwise 'legitimate' organisations as well as of illicit enterprises (Beare 2003). The ways in which legitimate economies are governed have direct implications for illegitimate actors in terms of opportunities created for them and loopholes they may be able to take advantage of (Ruggiero 2003).

Furthermore, in his analysis of several cases of transnational organised crime, Ruggiero suggests that such crime may 'mingle with entrepreneurial and, at times, governmental deviance'. This can occur, for instance, 'when legally produced goods are illegally marketed, or when the illegal marketing of goods produced in one country is supported by the complicity of corrupt politicians in a country in which those goods are officially banned'. Thus, according to Ruggiero, collusion between illegitimate and legitimate actors is essential to the success of transnational organised crime (Ruggiero 2003: 177).

Paoli adds that organised crime groupings that come closer to their mythological construction, such as the La Cosa Nostra or the Japanese Yakuza, cannot be understood simply in terms of their involvement in illegal activities. Most organisations that Paoli depicts as 'mafia-type associations' 'pre-existed the formation and expansion of modern illegal markets' and 'throughout their existence ... have carried out a plurality of functions, most of which are not related to the provision of illegal goods and services' (Paoli 2002: 63, 72).

Paoli further points out that 'organised crime' is much less 'organised' than what has traditionally been assumed in the literature and in police practice (Paoli 2002). Due to the illegal and hence covert nature of the activities carried out by dark networks, large and static organisational structures are not the form in which members of the networks are brought together. Rather, different individuals and groups come together to form networks in

particular time and space moments. Hence there is a distinction to be made between the activities of the networks and the individuals who carry out such activities, as the movement of individuals in and out of particular functions within illegal markets does not jeopardise the illegal market itself (Paoli 2002; Watkins 2004). Paoli explains:

The concept of a network is indeed a useful construct to describe the distribution system of illegal commodities. The strength and cohesion of most illegal networks, however, should not be overestimated. Although long-term relations may develop among network members, the majority of them are arm's-length buyer-seller relationships, which are neither exclusive in any sense nor centrally organized. Each illegal entrepreneur is free to look for other partners to execute the next transaction and usually belongs to more than one network at the same time since he has contact with several suppliers and has numerous customers to whom he can sell his merchandise. Moreover, in any point of the network, the actors generally know only their immediate supplier(s) and buyer(s) and have no idea of its overall extent and structure. Finally, it must never be forgotten that illegal networks are volatile constructions. They constantly change their form and extension, as new partners are included, others are occasionally or permanently discarded, and others are replaced because they have been targeted by law enforcement action (Paoli 2002: 67-68).

The redundancy, and hence resilience, of dark networks achieved through ebbs and flows of people in and out of particular functions is something that Gross Stein highlights in her analysis of terrorist networks. She too uses the language of 'nodes' and 'networks' in an attempt to shift thinking away from the assumption that security threats can be eliminated through traditional command and control governance exercised in the wielding of military might. She explains:

A network is a collection of connected points or nodes, generally designed to be resilient through redundancy. It can be one terminal, connected to the Internet, or one expert communicating with another expert in a common network devoted to a shared problem. The design of the network determines its resilience, its flexibility, its capacity to expand, and its vulnerability (Gross Stein 2001: 74).

For Gross Stein, this nodal understanding must guide strategic and tactical planning: 'No single approach against a single site - even the headquarters, to the extent they exist - will be effective. The implications are clear: removing a single node, or even several, will not destroy the network' (Gross Stein 2001: 74).

Australian and other police organisations around the world have begun adopting the language of nodes and networks in the strategic plans they are developing for organised crime, terrorism and related dark network activity. The newly developed Organized Crime Strategy (2005-09) of Victoria Police states that the organisation 'needs to change some of its internal structures, culture and thinking in order to succeed in matching and combating the fluid, flexible, dynamic and networked characteristics of organised crime networks' (Victoria Police 2005: 8). Central to this change is the development of its research and analytical capacity - one based on a nodal and networked

perspective - that provides the organisation with a timely and comprehensive knowledge base that can guide strategic and tactical planning.

The need for intelligence-led policing within networks of public agencies, communities, the private sector and international organisations is the focus of Wardlaw and Boughton's chapter (Chapter 6). This involves a shift in emphasis away from a narrow understanding of 'information' that is used to deal with specific criminal actors to 'intelligence', which they describe as 'value-added analysis for decision-making'. In their chapter, they describe a variety of challenges associated with quality collection, dissemination and analysis of intelligence within and across police and non-police organisations that have varying capabilities as well as interests.

Based on the above, we see that in the face of contemporary security challenges that come in the form of wicked problems and dark nodes and networks, the public police are required to participate in the development of networks - and indeed to actively constitute them. The previous chapters provide much insight into both the imperative for networks as well as the ways in which this imperative is met. A central theme cutting across these chapters is the need for police organisations to strategically position themselves in ways that enable them to most effectively take advantage of the capacities, resources, and knowledge/intelligence residing in other nodes and networks.

The challenge of network formation though, is not simply one of effective strategic positioning. The various analyses of challenges associated with network formation, as provided by contributors to this volume, reveal that every strategic choice is a normative one, even though some choices are less controversial than others. As Lewis and Wood mention at the beginning of their chapter, requests by governments to enhance the powers of their police agencies are currently very controversial, because according to some critics, they hit at the heart of core democratic principles such as freedom. Of course there are a variety of other issues and principles at stake that may receive less attention in the public domain. Ayling, Grabosky and Shearing provide a comprehensive discussion of the normative issues associated with practices of coercion, sale and gift in the harnessing of resources for networked policing. Wardlaw and Boughton discuss issues pertaining to the quality, integrity and security of information within a networked context. Lewis and Wood focus on the challenge of governing networks of policing and security provision both at nodal levels and in the totality of their operations. I do not wish to revisit such discussions here, but rather to move on to a discussion of what might be regarded as some generic 'design principles'² for guiding the public police in their network-building efforts, principles that could underlie ways in which they engage with, mobilise and connect to other forms of capacity, resources and knowledge/intelligence.

Making networks bright: generic design principles for the police

As Dupont's chapter reminds us, there is much we still don't know about how networks are formed by the various nodes within them. As Dupont observes, it is not just the public police or other state security organisations that play an active role in establishing the kinds of networks they desire. Rather, a plethora of other state institutions, private actors and community groups are active in this regard, shaping strategic and other alliances in ways that contribute to their particular interests, be they parochial or communal in some fashion (see also Crawford 2006). Furthermore, it is not just policy networks, or other formal ways of networking, that matter. There is also much that occurs informally, at the 'coal face', that builds new networking habits. Networks, Dupont writes, 'are established and maintained largely within the context of routine activities associated with the production of security'. We are also reminded by Rhodes (Chapter 1) that networks have not simply replaced bureaucracies and markets as forms of organisation. All three governance forms co-exist, albeit in often uneasy ways, and it is naive to assume that any one particular form is necessarily, on its own, better than any other.

If we take stock, however, of what we do know about the need for networks as well as the need for police organisations to actively build them, what might be some generic principles that guide this network-building process? As indicated previously, identification of such principles is gleaned largely from the insights of other contributors to this volume. Such authors revealed principles with varying degree of explicitness; for the most part, they did not describe them in terms of principles at all. What I wish to attempt is to repackage some of these insights into generic design principles. This discussion is based on the assumption - expressed in the analyses of the previous chapters - that if police do not simply want to become a node that is indistinguishable from others, how must they position themselves in networks to maintain a privileged identity and role within them? Expressed differently, how does a police organisation, as a node that is connected to other nodes, stand out for who they are and what they do? I offer the four following principles for consideration.

Maintain the symbolism of police

The continued emergence of private providers of policing and security that look like, and often act like, their counterparts in the public sector is significant not only in terms of the role confusion - and an associated confusion in legal authority - that may be created in the minds of the public. Nor is it simply significant from a governance or regulation perspective, which is the focus of Lewis and Wood's discussion. It is also significant as an (albeit colloquial) example of a possible erosion of police symbolism. Nodal and networked policing has the potential to gloss over what is distinctive about particular nodes - in terms of both their

identities and their roles - unless great care is taken in constituting nodal relationships. Lewis and Wood point out, drawing largely from Johnston's observations (Johnston 2000, 2006), that mentalities of policing and security provision - particularly those centred on punishment and risk - also mix and meld between providers. Not only has risk-based thinking penetrated the public sector; punitive practices of security delivery can be found creeping up in areas such as commercial military service provision (Johnston 2006).

Let us focus for a moment on the symbolism and identity of the police. We do know that this social institution continues to maintain considerable symbolic capital (Dupont 2003, 2006). According to Loader, the continued cultural significance of the police is not given sufficient attention in contemporary analyses of policing:

popular attachment to policing is principally *affective* in character, something which people evince a deep emotional commitment to and which is closely integrated with their sense of self. Policing, it seems, can provide an interpretive lens through which people make sense of, and give order to, their world; the source of a set of plausible stories about that world which help people sustain 'ontological security' (Giddens 1991). As such, the attachment to policing is unlikely to be shifted merely by demonstrating that it is in some sense or other irrational or wrong-headed (Loader 1997: 3).

It is against this backdrop that one might refer to the police as having not only coercive power, but also symbolic power:

The symbolic power of the police has become the power of legitimate pronouncement: a power to diagnose, classify, authorize, and represent both individuals and the world, and to have this power of 'legitimate naming' not just taken seriously, but taken-for-granted ... the police's entitlement and capacity to speak about the world is seldom challenged. They start from a winning position (Loader 1997: 3).

Based on Dupont's analysis of 'power struggles' in the field of policing and security (Dupont 2006), it is not sufficient for police to assume that their symbolic power and cultural significance will carry them through changing times. Indeed, other providers of policing and security are amassing various forms of capital (economic, political, social and symbolic) and are doing so rather successfully. Police managers know this, as do unionists (Fleming, Marks & Wood 2006), and as such are themselves accumulating and deploying various forms of capital as they 'jockey for position' in the field. Dupont observes that an important objective guiding the power struggles of police managers is to achieve a central and 'professional' place in the field of policing and security provision (Dupont 2006).

Before I discuss Dupont's observation regarding police professionalism, I will turn to an example of a 'power play' that is currently being carried out by Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police. It is devoted to the accumulation of economic capital through attempts to monopolise the market, particularly the market for 'reassurance policing'. It is not,

however, simply a strategy for re-producing police hegemony. It is a way of asserting an identity for the police as a culturally significant, publicly legitimate and highly skilled and professional service that, through its monopoly of the field, will optimise security outcomes for all. This is not a strategy that I necessarily advocate. But it provides one example of how to realise the next design principle, which is to constitute markets in ways that align public interests with other common interests (Shearing & Wood 2003), or what Crawford describes as 'club goods' (Crawford 2006).

Constitute markets to promote public interests

Sklansky argues that much greater attention needs to be paid to the potential threats to democracy posed by the growth in private security. One such threat comes in the form of 'dampening political support for public law enforcement committed, at least nominally, to protecting everyone against illegal violence'. He goes on: 'The result may be a system of policing even less egalitarian than the one we have today' (Sklansky 2006). This threat constitutes a key part of the 'public goods' problem that has been of great concern to many scholars, including Loader and Walker (2001, 2006) and Crawford (2006).

One way of approaching this challenge is to conceptualise it as a problem of governing all nodes and networks of security providers in new and 'hybrid' ways in accordance with public interest norms (Lewis and Wood, Chapter 10). Another way of approaching it is for police to become highly successful participants in the security market so that they can, in effect, monopolise that market. Sir Ian Blair, Commissioner of the London Metropolitan Police, has been attempting to do just that, having recognised the importance of 'jockeying for position' in the security market if the police are to remain instrumentally effective as well as symbolically dominant.

Blair has been relatively open and transparent in revealing his own existential angst about the identity and role of the police in the context of 'little dispassionate, thought-through, public examination of just what it is we are here to do in the 21st century' (Blair 2005). He regularly prepares and delivers papers for conferences, such as for the British Society of Criminology Annual Meeting (2002) and the Law Commission of Canada's *In Search of Security* conference (2003), and recently delivered the Dimpleby Lecture (November 2005). In these presentations he has argued that it is not enough for the police to position themselves as simply one service provider among many within a policing and security market, even if this position is a privileged one as a certifier or regulator of some sort. His position now is that the police must compete aggressively in this market (Blair 2003), to the point where he stated that the Metropolitan Police was now 'trying to monopolise the market' (*The Economist* 2005).

The reasons for this are both instrumental and symbolic. Instrumentally, such a monopoly would maximise police effectiveness

in relation to local, wicked issues of security as well as to the new forms of insecurity produced through dark networks. Blair explains that the mission of the public police has widened, given current preoccupations with antisocial behaviour which is 'threatening our ability to lead free lives' as well as with new forms of terrorism, as recently experienced in the London bombings of July 2005. The knowledge and capacity required to understand and act upon the range of local, national and international threats to security must, he argues, be housed within a 'single police service'. He explains:

What we should seek to avoid, at all costs, is a separation of local, neighbourhood policing from either serious criminal investigation or counter terrorist investigation. Every lesson of every police inquiry is that, not only the issues that give rise to anti-social behaviour, but also those that give rise to criminal activity and to terrorism, begin at the most local level (Blair 2005: 12-13).

He goes on to say:

Thus national security depends on neighbourhood security.

It will not be a Special Branch officer at Scotland Yard who first confronts a terrorist, but a local cop or a local community support officer.

It is not the police and the intelligence agencies who will defeat crime and terror and anti-social behaviour; it is communities.

We do not want one kind of police force being nice to people and another one arriving in darkened vans wearing the balaclavas.

Whoever is responsible for the one has to be responsible for the other (Blair 2005: 12-13).

A big component of Blair's plan has been the establishment of Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) (mentioned in the above passage) who operate effectively as a second-tier police service, as part of the 'extended police family', owned and operated by the Metropolitan Police but wielding less power than a regular police officer. The PCSOs are in the market for work with organisations such as shopping malls, local authorities and housing associations (*The Economist* 2005: 41). This forms part of Blair's vision for a single police service that is 'engaged with and accountable to the community and being shaped by the needs of citizens, capable of dealing with every requirement from truancy to terror, from graffiti to gunmen'. He argues passionately, however, for more active engagement by members of the public in debates about their vision for policing. As he puts it, 'You need to decide what kind of police service we want' (Blair 2005: 14).

Blair's remarks serve to reaffirm the link between policing and the public good. In forging this link, an understanding of the police as a highly skilled, professional and democratic organisation is reinforced. The desire to reimagine policing as an 'exclusive domain of practice' (Australasian Police Professional Standards Council 2006) is also on the minds of police managers and leaders, and constitutes the next design principle.

Reassert policing as an 'exclusive domain of practice'

To return to an earlier point, scholars have observed a mixing and melding of mentalities among police and security providers. Sklansky raises a concern related to this observation when he talks about the 'transfer of norms' between public and private police. This includes the transfer of private sector thinking into the management of public policing (that is, the 'new managerialism'). He points out that one way of distinguishing between public and private policing organisations - and clearly an important way, in his view - is to see private organisations being concerned with 'efficiency and goal achievement' and public organisations being concerned with '[taking] into account broader values such as integrity, the accommodation of interests, and morality' (Selznick 1969, cited in Joh 2004, and see Sklansky 2006). 'Community policing,' Sklansky explains:

has meant reducing the organizational insularity by opening new channels of communication and co-operation with a variety of outside groups, both governmental and nongovernmental. Officers in these departments have been forced, regularly and systematically, to confront and to accommodate conflicting views of their mission and conflicting notions of how best to balance liberty and security. They have been pushed away, in other words, from a single-minded focus on a narrow set of performance goals ... There is no corresponding trend in the private security industry (Sklansky 2006).

In this particular passage, Sklansky is also reasserting a link between policing and public interest objectives. Their public mission is what distinguishes police from other providers. At the same time, police leaders are seeking to clarify what it is that is distinctive about the knowledge and capacities required for police work, and this is partly an existential exercise. For example, the Australasian Police Professional Standards Council (APPSC) (APPSC 2006, and see Burgess, Chapter 7) has taken the position that while a professionalisation agenda is further advanced through initiatives in areas such as education and training and ethics, it is essential to begin with a deep understanding of what professional policing is and how it can be defined. It is instructive to hear from a lengthy passage:

In order for an occupation to claim professional status, the domain of professional practice must be identified and delineated from the work of others in similar, related or complementary occupations. This will demonstrate to the community that police, as experts, have claim to an *exclusive domain of practice*.

... This involves defining the nature of the profession that will be the basis for future strategies and the establishment and maintenance of a professional police occupation. Within public policing, the skills base and knowledge base of practice have rapidly expanded. Police services have responded to the need to keep abreast of technology and criminal techniques by the creation of more specialised and highly educated police in areas of technical support, forensic science, fraud investigation and high tech crime. This has been accompanied by

increasing employment of non-sworn specialists and professionals. Outside public policing, there has been a growth of specialised investigative and regulatory agencies within federal and state jurisdictions, with many government employees exercising powers that intersect with traditional police roles. In the security sector, the traditional work of police is supplemented by government and private suppliers providing patrol guardianship and protection services ... The parameters of the policing profession impact on what courses form part of a university degree in policing, what ethical standards are established and how they are regulated, the criteria for competency and accreditation and who will be eligible for registration as a policing professional. A definition also educates and informs the public and allied professions about *what it is that police do, and what they stand for*, rather than leaving the profession as a situation where a definition is imposed from outside the field (APPSC 2006: 2-3, italics added).

Thinking about what the police do and what they stand for is therefore partly a project on identity and partly a project on capacity/capability. The identity work, as the above suggests, is something that is urgently needed given the kinds of developments that are emblematic in the example of St Bernard's Parish, Louisiana. In practical terms, it may be very difficult for everyday citizens to distinguish between an officer from the Sheriff's Department and an officer from DynCorp, particularly if they are sporting the same uniforms. Yet what the APPSC is saying is that there is, or at least ought to be, something very distinctive about what the Sheriff's Department does and what it stands for in that parish, including within the parameters of its newly established trailer camp.

The above passage also highlights the degree to which police have been required to expand their knowledge and capacities in order to meet the strategic challenges of the 21st century. They have done so in various ways including, as the passage suggests, through the creation of new specialist units and specialist police skills in areas such as new technologies and investigative methods. They have also developed the capacity to identify the kinds of knowledge and skills that civilian personnel can bring to policing. Given this growing acceptance of non-police skills in policing, as well as the expansion of knowledge and capacities beyond the organisational confines of the police, the status of the police remains elevated. At the very least there is a yearning for this high status to be so. For instance, participants at the Police Commissioners' Conference of March 2005 proclaimed the need to 'progress policing from an occupation to a profession' (in APPSC 2006: 2).

From a police union perspective, Chapter 7 in this volume, by Burgess, expresses the importance of seeing the police first and foremost as 'professionals with a unique set of skills and ethics'. Wardlaw and Boughton (Chapter 6) emphasise the importance of continuous capacity development. In discussing the 'professionalisation of intelligence', they argue that, 'Surviving and contributing to the new era of policing requires significant

investment in the continued development of competencies for intelligence officers, new training and education options and a major push for the continuous development of new analytical techniques.'

As Bradley, Nixon and Marks suggest, it is not simply the quality and distinctiveness of the skills and ethics that contribute to the professionalism of policing. The ways in which police undertake and engage with research to inform strategic and tactical innovation can, and must, distinguish the police from others. The vision they have for police research is one that, like other transformations discussed above, requires organisational and cultural change. It requires new ways of bringing together academics and practitioners in knowledge-generating networks. Complementing Wardlaw and Boughton's views then, they suggest that it is not simply enough to produce high standards in 'intelligence'. In advocating a 'participatory action research' (PAR) approach, Bradley and colleagues envision deeply collaborative research whereby practitioners 'are directly involved in the research process from the point of problem identification to research design to data collection and analysis and thereafter to dissemination and uptake of research findings and recommendations'. One of the assumptions behind the PAR model is that as 'owners' of the research process, police knowledge and experience will be valued and integrated into new practical applications.

The above ideas about enhancing police knowledge and capacity are thus central, and by no means exclusive, components of a broader agenda devoted to enhancing and improving the status of the police as professionals. At the same time, other policy-makers, practitioners and academics have emphasised the privileged role of the police in enabling and developing other knowledge and capacities that contribute to public policing and security objectives. This leads us to the last key design principle, which relates to police as facilitators and shapers of multi-capacity policing.

Enable and develop other knowledge and capacities

Within a nodal environment, police play an important 'brokering' role to other nodes and to the other specialised domains of practice that may distinguish them. There are a variety of ways in which brokering can take place and a variety of directions in which it can occur. A simple typology can be constructed in terms of downward, horizontal and upward brokering. Downward brokering to forms of 'local capacity governance' is something that Shearing has advocated for many years, particularly in respect to community peace building practices (Shearing 2001). For Shearing, part of the brokering role involves giving non-police actors the space, in figurative terms, to develop new and innovative solutions to local security problems, provided such solutions are lawful (Shearing & Wood 2003). This could involve brokering to a vast array of crime prevention groups who, for example, explore social development or environmental design approaches or, in the case of Shearing's work, local 'peace committees' (Johnston & Shearing 2003: 151-60) that undertake

conflict resolution and related 'micro-governance' processes (Burriss 2004) that contribute to the social and economic development of a particular (in this case poor) community. Police do not lead such groups, but simply link to them. At the same time, the police can be mobilised by such groups if it is seen that police specialist knowledge and skills must be brought in to address a particular security or broader governance problem. As brokers, the notion of policing as a specialised domain of practice is reinforced. That being said, police officers must have the capabilities required to broker effectively, which means that they must have a grasp of alternative ways of thinking about and promoting security and be aware of which actors lay claim to these alternative views and advance them effectively. In essence, police must be experts on the nature of wicked problems.

This vision complements that put forward by Braithwaite (Chapter 9) on peacemaking networks and restorative justice. Not only must police allow the space for local knowledge and capacity to flourish in ways that build peace; they must also 'secure islands of civility as nodes from which peacebuilding networks are built outwards'. As part of this, they must protect peace-builders and others, such as human rights activists, whose campaigns for peace threaten those who have a stake in ongoing conflict and war. The theory of 'responsive regulation' (Ayres & Braithwaite 1992) that informs Braithwaite's analysis maintains a privileged place for the police as legitimate specialists in the exercise of coercion. The nature and degree of coercion that is required in pacifying any one conflict depends on the effectiveness of more deliberative security solutions (such as restorative justice) lower down on the regulatory pyramid. The base of the pyramid must consist of skilled local peacemakers, because 'Local creativity, and familiarity with local custom, are crucial to turning ripples into waves of peace that wash across a nation.'

For Braithwaite then, informing the role of the police is their unique knowledge of 'sympathetic combatants' who could be 'drawn into reconciliation processes'. It is possible, Braithwaite writes, that the 'key combatants who first step in to the circle can then become translators of the mentalities of the peacemakers to the mentalities of the war-makers, and vice versa'. According to Braithwaite's analysis, the essential role of the police is thus to protect and nurture islands of civility.

There are also those who continue to place a high priority on more direct forms of capacity-building and knowledge transfer - as undertaken by, for example, organisations such as the AFP for the benefit of police agencies in other parts of the Asia-Pacific Region, particularly those operating in weak and failing states. This is the focus of Keelty's chapter in this volume (Chapter 5), and is part of how the AFP reasserts its exclusive domain of practice. While there are explicit instrumental reasons for transferring particular skills and knowledge to recipient organisations, such as to enhance uniformity and integration of operations across countries, Keelty

also recognises that forms of indigenous knowledge and capacity, and the cultural traditions that inform them, must be respected and privileged in international capacity-building networks.

As previously indicated, the above design principles are largely gleaned from the insights of various contributors to this volume. As principles they are very broad and serve more as normative guides than concrete prescriptions. In Dupont's terms (Chapter 2), the police are best understood as operating within a 'securisphere' - one that is fluid and ever changing - rather than as exercising a state monopoly in security provision. That this securisphere is ever changing does not mean that the police have no control over its ebbs and flows. And indeed, as research has shown, police leaders know this, for the most part. They know that the police must always reflect on their place within this securisphere vis-à-vis other security providers and must be cognisant of how it operates normatively as well as strategically. There is much that police leaders and unionists are doing to think proactively about their positioning within the securisphere, but as most observers concede, there is still more to be done. Central to moving forward will be a clear position on the place of the public police in society.

Conclusion

There is much we don't know about how dark networks operate and there is much we don't know about how bright networks are formed. What we do know, however, is that the language of nodes and networks provides a crucial guide in the development of new tactics and strategies on the part of public police organisations. Bright networks involve the identification, mobilisation and integration of various forms of knowledge, capacity and resources from within and outside public policing. All the chapters in this volume recognise the need for knowledge networks, capacity networks and resource networks, notwithstanding the difficulties of forming and sustaining such networks in practice.

The chapters herein illuminate a variety of ways in which such networks are currently constituted and they reveal some of their normative implications. This chapter has attempted to take stock of what these authors, and others, imply, in normative terms, as to how the police should position themselves normatively in networks of policing and security provision. The consensus seems to be that as the police seek to adapt to the contemporary challenges stemming from wicked problems and dark networks, and even if they are required to do so in rather *ad hoc* and contingent ways, they must be guided by a vision of themselves and their distinctive role in society. As part of this, they will be required to explore smarter ways of policing that confirm rather than undermine their commitment to democratic principles. In so doing, the police must play an active role in the constitution of networks, mindful that their current symbolic importance and operational distinctiveness cannot be taken for granted. A clear and bright vision of what police do and what they

stand for will guide them through the increasingly amorphous securisphere.

Endnotes

- 1 Here and in the following sentences I rely on remarks made by Brigadier Bruce Oxborn, Colonel Bob Breen and Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer at a seminar, *Monitoring Peace in Bougainville* (organised by the State, Society and Governance in Melanesia Project, and held at the Australian National University, Canberra, on 8 September 1999). (I removed the marker at the end of the chapter title and put it at the end of the first sentence, but there are only two endnote markers, and the one labelled 2 is clearly the Shearing one, so something's gone astray among the first two. Can you pls let me know where the third one should be?) This first endnote does not come from me - looks like it is from Braithwaite's chapter.
- 2 I'm very grateful to Monique Marks, whose insights have contributed significantly to the shape of this chapter.
- 3 I wish to acknowledge Clifford Shearing's insights into the importance of establishing design principles.

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